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This paper uses archival board data to demonstrate that women who take positions as di-
rectors of UK companies have shorter tenures than their male counterparts. The authors
show that female directors face a much higher risk of dismissal as they approach nine
years of service on the board, when their long service deprives them of the all-important
classiﬁcation as ‘independent’. At this point, their position on the board becomes pre-
carious. Male directors do not suffer the same increase in boardroom exit. This gender-
speciﬁc difference is clearly shown to be linked to the independence status. It is argued
that these observations are consistent with the notion that female directors are being used
in the symbolic management of corporate governance and that, at nine years, when the
cloak of independence disappears, women directors are then exposed to the biases that
arise from role congruity issues.
Introduction
The Sex Discrimination Act became law in the
UK in 1975. It was intended to eliminate labour
market discrimination on the grounds of sex or
marital status. In the year 2000, some 25 years
after it came into force, only around 6% of board
positions on FTSE 100 companies were held by
women. By 2015, this had risen to 25%, but only
after considerable government pressure.1 The
situation in the FTSE 250 and elsewhere is less
encouraging. The analysis in this paper will show
that the challenge facing women on UK boards is
not only their under-representation, but also their
subsequent experience once they are appointed
to a board. Their position on the board is more
precarious than that of their male counterparts.
Brian G. M. Main acknowledges research support under
ESRC Grant: RES-062-23-0904.
1See the BoardWatchwebsite at http://www.boardsforum.
co.uk/boardwatch.html.
Women tend to experience briefer tenures as
boardroom directors than men do.
This points to a possible additional source
of discrimination over and above those already
identiﬁed and described by the epithets ‘glass
ceiling’ (Hymowitz and Schellhardt, 1986), where
otherwise qualiﬁed women ﬁnd it difficult to
make the same career progress as males, or the
‘glass escalator’ (Williams, 1992), where even in
female-dominated professions such as nursing
and teaching males rise to the top jobs with
relative ease. One further such discriminatory
mechanism that has gained considerable attention
and which highlights the often precarious nature
of women’s employment in senior positions is
the ‘glass cliff’ (Ryan and Haslam, 2005). The
glass cliff phenomenon occurs where women
are more likely to be appointed to those boards
that are contemporaneously experiencing periods
of underperformance or other turmoil. Conse-
quently, the career prospects of such appointees
are more risky and more likely to result in early
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failure. It is possible that, among other factors,
this glass cliff phenomenon is contributing to the
under-representation of women on boards.
There is an additional explanation of this short
tenure of female directors, namely symbolic man-
agement. Westphal and Zajac (1994) outlined the
concept of symbolic management in the context of
executive incentive plans serving a symbolic role
by publicly demonstrating a commitment to pay
for performance, rather than arising from any par-
ticular intent to align executive incentives with
shareholder interests. This explanation of sym-
bolic management suggests that, in the interests
of self-preservation, the board may take actions to
be seen to comply with the expectations of institu-
tional best practice. The appointment of a woman
as an independent director enables the board to
achieve two objectives. Such an action satisﬁes the
call for increased gender diversity and, at the same
time, can increase the proportion of independent
outside directors. Appointments of this nature
raise the possibility that at least some female par-
ticipation in the boardroom reﬂects such symbolic
management of corporate governance rather than
a broad acceptance of the principle that gender di-
versity is good for business (Hoobler et al., 2016).
A consequence of this perspective of woman
directors being appointed as part of the symbolic
management of the independence of the board is
that, when these directors lose their independence
under the UK Corporate Governance Code,
which happens when the director ‘has served on
the board for more than nine years from the date
of their ﬁrst election’ (FRC, 2014, B.1.1), they
will have outlived their perceived usefulness and
are likely to exit the board. Of course, both male
and female directors are more liable to exit after
crossing the institutionally determined nine-year
service boundary. But for women it will be a more
disruptive event if their presence on the board is
disproportionately valued for their independence
status. In that case, the ‘explain’ option, available
under the UK’s ‘comply or explain’ corporate
governance regime (FRC, 2014), is less likely to be
exercised for women in mitigation of longer board
service.
This paper contributes to what will be seen be-
low to be a growing literature (Bruckmuller et al.,
2014; Ryan andHaslam, 2007) that emphasizes the
precarious nature of women directors’ positions
on company boards. We are able to investigate the
interplay between institutional forces such as the
UKCorporateGovernance Code (FRC, 2014), the
independence status of directors and board-level
decision-making regarding the continuing service
of directors.
In order to analyse these issues, we use a
database that captures boardroom appointments
in FTSE-All-Share companies between 1996 and
2010. This database offers an important advantage
over the prior literature, namely it allows us to ob-
serve a large sample of female and male careers,
as they play out in the boardroom. The next sec-
tion of the paper reviews the literature in the area.
We then introduce the data and methods used in
the analysis, before presenting the results. The pa-
per ends with a discussion of the implications for
policy and theory.
Theoretical background
Glass cliff
The presence of labour market discrimination, i.e.
the valuation in the labour market of personal
characteristics such as gender or race that are
unrelated to productivity in the job, has been anal-
ysed in depth by Becker (1957). Its persistence,
of course, calls into question the efficacy of the
market forces (Arrow, 1972) that should render
such irrational labour market practices unprof-
itable. Standard explanations of the empirically
observed persistence of labour market discrim-
ination include: human capital (Mincer and
Polachek, 1974); intergroup bias (Hewstone,
Rubin and Willis, 2002); monopsony power
(Manning, 2003; Ransom and Oaxaca, 2010);
occupational segregation (Bergmann, 1974) –
leading to the notion of a glass ceiling (Powell and
Butterﬁeld, 1994); part-time working (Main, 1988;
Main and Reilly, 1992); and social role theory
(Eagly, 1987).
Recently, attention has been given to the lack
of progress of women in one particular area of
the labour market – the relative absence of women
in senior management positions. Explanations
based on insufficient supply of talent have been
questioned by empirical studies of boardroom
appointments (Singh, Terjsen and Vinnicombe,
2008). While there remains an ongoing debate re-
garding the added productivity of gender diversity
on company boards (Adams and Ferreira, 2009;
Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Desvaux, Devuillard-
Hoellinger and Baumgarten, 2007; Hoobler et al.,
© 2017 The Authors British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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2016; Singh, Vinnicombe and Johnson, 2001), the
evidence regarding restricted access to boardroom
positions is well established (Farrell and Hersch,
2005; Gregory-Smith, Main and O’Reilly, 2014;
Lyness and Heilman, 2006; Oakley, 2000).
Traditional perspectives describe how the oper-
ation of the labour market deprives women of de-
sirable employment outcomes, such as promoted
positions or higher wages (Kulich et al., 2011). The
novelty of the glass-cliff model (Ryan and Haslam,
2005) is that it describes a situation where the
odds are relatively favourable towards women can-
didates. But the appointment is to a position of
seniority that is risky or tainted by recent experi-
ence of corporate underperformance and, conse-
quently, precarious. The contrast is with the so-
cial role theory outcome of ‘think manager, think
male’ (Eagly, 1987; Schein, 1973), where stereo-
typical beliefs about what makes a good manager
are seen to coincide with stereotypical masculine
traits. The difference in situations of crisis is that
the response is to favour stereotypically female
attributes, i.e. ‘think crisis, think female’ (Bruck-
muller et al., 2014; Glass and Cook, 2016). The
argument is not about the relative risk aversion
of men vs. women – a topic that has attracted at-
tention since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 (Adams
and Ragunathan, 2013). The glass-cliff argument
is that women are being appointed to precarious
boardroom positions, possibly as a way of sig-
nalling to shareholders that a radically different
approach is now being adopted (Khurana, 2002;
Ryan andHaslam, 2005). If such appointments are
merely signals and women are not supported but,
in fact, subjected to heightened scrutiny (Glass
and Cook, 2016), they do indeed ﬁnd themselves
in a precarious position. Our argument is that,
if women directors are appointed as a signal of
independence, when that status is lost they will
ﬁnd themselves in a disproportionately precari-
ous position. The glass-cliff analysis has subse-
quently been replicated, ﬁnding evidence of the
effect in several empirical settings (Ashby, Ryan
and Haslam, 2007; Bruckmuller and Branscombe,
2010; Glass and Cook, 2016; Haslam and Ryan,
2008; Haslam et al., 2010; Rink, Ryan and Stoker,
2012, 2013; Ryan et al., 2011). These arguments
and studies are reviewed in Bruckmuller et al.
(2014) and Ryan et al. (2016).
Recent support for the glass-cliff hypothesis
comes from Mulcahy and Linehan (2014), who
useDataStreamdata describing quoted companies
between 2004 and 2006 to construct a matched
sample of companies separated by whether or not
they experienced a loss in the prior two periods be-
fore being non-loss making. Focusing on the gen-
der diversity of the board, the authors then use a
difference-in-differences estimator to test the hy-
pothesis that troubled companies are more likely
to increase their gender diversity after experienc-
ing the initial loss.
Whereas these authors initially fail to establish
a signiﬁcant difference in behaviour between the
groups, when they focus on target companies that
experienced ‘large’ (above median) losses, then a
signiﬁcant effect does emerge, consistent with the
glass cliff hypothesis.
The point of departure in this paper vis-a`-vis the
prior evidence on the glass cliff is that we have data
that can track a large number of female and male
careers over their lifetime in the boardroom. Using
survival panel data methods, we are able to exam-
ine directly how the risk of exit facing female di-
rectors varies over their careers. Given, as we show
later, that women have shorter careers than men,
we use our data to focus on the dynamic evolution
of female careers and provide additional evidence
on the prevalence of the glass cliff phenomenon.
The glass-cliff hypothesis tested here is:
H1: The change in gender diversity on the board
of initial loss ﬁrms is positively related to the
severity of the loss.
Symbolic management
It has long been recognized that boards are aware
of the importance of selectingmembers not only to
work together internally as a team, but also to pro-
vide contacts and access to a wider community of
stakeholders (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). Such
a perspective goes beyond the reﬂex biases that
come about under the homosocial reproduction
that results from the ‘think manager-think male’
culture of Schein (1973) and which restrain hiring
of female directors. As seen above in the discus-
sion of the glass cliff, this can also lead to a ‘think
crisis, think female’ reaction under certain circum-
stances (Glass and Cook, 2016; Ryan et al., 2011).
But in such matters it is also possible that, with
or without a crisis, there is an awareness that be-
ing seen to hire women as directors may advan-
tage the company, either by relieving social pres-
sure or by easing the company’s access to resources
and relationships with its stakeholders. This
© 2017 The Authors British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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symbolic management (Westphal and Zajac, 1998)
or ‘tokenism’ (Kanter, 1977) regards the company
as paying lip service to gender equality in hiring.
The area of impression management known as
symbolic management (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Zott
and Huy, 2007), opens up the possibility of women
being appointed to boards with an eye to the ex-
ternal signal that this provides, such as underlin-
ing the independence of these appointments. In-
stitutional pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Main et al., 2008; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott,
2001), both regulatory in the form of Corporate
Governance codes and normative through profes-
sional standards,2 demands the appointment of in-
dependent directors. Women present a clear signal
of both independence and diversity, and their ap-
pointment to the board may facilitate impression
management to the advantage of the company.
Several studies (Hambrick, Werder and Zajac,
2008; Wade, Porac and Pollock, 1997; Westphal
and Zajac, 1994, 1995, 1998) have demonstrated
that there is a symbolic perspective in corpo-
rate governance that helps explain the actions of
boards. There is a decoupling of the formal board
structure and the appointments process, whereby
certain appointments are made with an eye to the
symbolism of that action. For example, follow-
ing the ﬁnancial crisis, there was much discussion
of the advantages of having women directors on
a board, and how things might have been differ-
ent had there been more women on the boards
of ﬁnancial institutions pre-2008 (Adams and Ra-
gunathan, 2013). In the context of the argument
here, the key consideration is the appointment of
women to boards as symbols of independence. For
those women appointed as outside directors, the
independence trait is crucial (Burgess and Thare-
nou, 2002;Hillman, Shropshire andCanella, 2007)
in effecting the legitimacy gained by conforming
to societal norms and expectations (Dowling and
Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995).Wewill argue below
that this is not as much the case for the appoint-
ment of male outside directors.
The independence trait or classiﬁcation also
plays a role in countering the tensions that arise
owing to role congruity issues (Eagly, 1987; Eagly
2See GC100 (2013). The GC100 and Investor Group,
which publishes these guidelines, is a representative body
of the company lawyers and Company Secretaries from
the FTSE 100 companies plus representatives of leading
pension and investment ﬁrms.
and Karau, 2002; Stryker and Macke, 1978). Role
congruity theory predicts that women will be less
likely than men to be selected as leaders, owing to
the traits thought needed for a leadership role be-
ing incongruent with the gender stereotypes held
regarding the traits possessed by women. Indepen-
dence can be seen as an antidote, shielding women
from the potential prejudice of fellow board direc-
tors who operate under such a stereotypical view
of women, which is incongruent with the attributes
thought to be required for the role of main-board
director. However, once the communal attribute of
independence is shed, the more agentic attributes
(Bakan, 1966; Eagly, 1987; Rosette and Tost, 2010)
of the long-serving director come into focus under
a ‘comply or explain’ regime that requires an ex-
planation of continuing service. It is possible, then,
that the socio-typical male/female distinctions of
assertiveness, aggressiveness, dominance, forceful-
ness and self-conﬁdence (Eagly and Karau, 2002)
tip the scales against women continuing to serve on
the board – scales that no longer have the counter-
balance of independence as a consideration.
The role congruity theory of bias against women
holding senior leadership roles has received con-
siderable support in laboratory studies (Eagly and
Carli, 2003; Heilman and Eagly, 2008; Hoyt, 2012;
Johnson et al., 2008; Paustian-Underdahl, Walker
and Woehr, 2014; Ritter and Yoder, 2005). In the
present context, the role congruity issue arises
from the tension between stereotypical expecta-
tions of how women behave and how boardroom
directors should behave (Chizema, Kamuriwo and
Shinozawa, 2015; Eagly and Karau, 2002; Gabal-
don et al., 2016). The communal nature of in-
dependence as validated by normative guidelines
of the corporate governance codes (FRC, 2014)
serves to mask the tension for just as long as
the independence attribute is valid (Rosette and
Tost, 2010), but role incongruence becomes more
salient once this falls away (as it does for all non-
executive directors at the nine-year tenuremark). It
is as if, when the attribute of independence is lost,
the female director ﬁnds herself in a different so-
cial role and one for which she is stereotypically
mismatched. Some have characterized women as
being in a gender double bind (Catalyst, 2007;
Elsesser, 2016; Elsesser and Lever, 2011; Jamieson,
1995) – caught by both a descriptive bias (think-
ing women do not have what it takes to be a com-
pany board director) and a prescriptive bias (the
belief that, as women, they should not possess the
© 2017 The Authors British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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characteristics necessary to be successful company
board directors). While it is impossible to disen-
tangle these two biases using archival data, the
concept of the double bind does illustrate the
potential for women directors to ﬁnd themselves in
a no-win situation and their positions at risk once
the independence status is lost (Fine, 2005).
It follows that if, unlike men, women are ap-
pointed predominantly for their independence,
they are more vulnerable once that perceived
independence evaporates. The nine-year limit for
service on a board as an independent director has
been a convention since Cadbury (1992), although
only formalized by Higgs (2003). Under the
UK’s ‘comply or explain’ approach to corporate
governance (FRC, 2014), it is perfectly possible
for directors to be kept on after their ninth year,
whereas if their sole reason for being on the board
is their ‘independence’, an exit at that point is
more likely. Davies (2011) has made clear that
women remain under-represented on UK boards.
However, even when they are present, if that
presence is owed to symbolic management of the
type described here, women’s tenure as directors
can be expected to be foreshortened. Speciﬁcally,
it will be foreshortened to the extent that their
designation as ‘independent’ has a limited shelf
life – nine years in the UK (FRC, 2014). Without
the independence designation, women are exposed
to the role incongruity biases that arise from
stereotypical views as to the suitability of women
for such senior leadership positions.
This suggests that the gender-difference in the
hazard rate of board exit increases signiﬁcantly
once the attribute of independence is lost at the
nine-year mark, when biases emerge owing to per-
ceived role incongruity (Eagly, 1987; Stryker and
Macke, 1978). Our second and third hypotheses
are, therefore:
H2: After nine years of board service, the hazard
rate of board exit increases for female directors
relative to male directors.
H3: The increase in the relative hazard rate of
board exit for women is associated with a loss of
independence.
In summary, if women are systematically ap-
pointed to positions of greater risk, as under the
glass-cliff hypothesis, then we would expect them
to have shorter careers as they run into early ca-
reer hazards. Equally, if female appointments are
at least to some extent inﬂuenced by the con-
sideration of the symbolic management of cor-
porate governance, a complementary explanation
appears – one that positions the glass cliff at the
nine-year tenure mark of boardroom careers. This
is particularly true if the appointment of women
directors nevertheless leaves in place the biased
stereotypes that create issues of role congruity for
women inhabiting such social roles.
Data and research methods
Sample
Our data consist of the sample of UK listed com-
panies in the FTSE All-Share Index between 1996
and 2010 as held byManifest Information Services
Ltd.3 The Manifest data record the date of ap-
pointment of each director to the board and the
date of resignation or departure from the board
(as ﬁled with Companies House). Additional de-
tail on the personal characteristics of the direc-
tors and of the companies involved is also avail-
able through Manifest (Gregory-Smith and Main,
2015). Further company-speciﬁc data are derived
from DataStream. In total, 1453 female directors
and 23,134 male directors are observed across 979
companies over the period 1996–2010.
Measures used
Measures deployed to capture the attributes of
each director include: ‘Female’, the dummy vari-
able designating gender;4 ‘Age on appointment’,
the age in years of the director when appointed to
the board; ‘Executive’, the dummy variable desig-
nating the director as an employee of the company,
i.e. part of senior management; and ‘Non-exec’,
the classiﬁcation that includes all other directors,
i.e. those who are not employees of the company.
This last group can be further designated as ‘In-
dependent’ or ‘Non-independent’. In doing this,
we use Manifest’s classiﬁcation of ‘Independent’,
which is based on their own assessment (as a Proxy
Voting Agency), but reﬂects the generally held
3This excludes ‘Fledgling’ companies and companies
listed on ‘AIM’.
4See Gregory et al. (2013) for a discussion of the now
well-recognized fact that gender as a social construction
is distinct from biological sex and not equivalent. We will
purposefully use gender in the context of the current
paper.
© 2017 The Authors British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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views of the institutional investor community that
they advise. Manifest bases its classiﬁcation on
considerations such as whether the non-executive
director in question is a former employee, has a
business relationship or family ties with the com-
pany, is associated with a major shareholder in the
company, has a cross directorship with executives
of the company or has served on the board for in
excess of nine years. This deﬁnition is applied on a
consistent basis over the entire period of the study.
‘Senior Director’ (SNED) refers to those non-
executive directors who have been identiﬁed by the
company as the designated senior non-executive
director. The SNED position is a channel through
which major shareholders can communicate
with the executive team, and the position is
typically remunerated with a supplementary fee.5
‘Tenure’ records the years of service since ﬁrst
appointment to the board as either an executive
or non-executive director. Finally, ‘CEO’ refers to
those executive directors who attain the rank of
chief executive officer in their boardroom career.
Descriptors of the company include ‘Ln Firm
Size’, which is the natural logarithm of the com-
pany’s turnover in that year. Performance is mea-
sured by: the market-based measure ‘Total Share-
holder Return’ (TSR), which measures the gains
to shareholders from dividend yield and share-
price appreciation; the ﬁnancial measure ‘Return
on Assets’ (ROA), which measures earnings rela-
tive to the total assets of the company; and ‘Price
to Book’ (PTOB), a performance measure akin to
Tobin’s Q, which measures the ratio of the com-
pany’s stock market valuation of the company’s
shares to the accounting book value of equity, and
gauges the market’s estimate of its growth poten-
tial. ‘Volatility’ measures the uncertainty in the
company’s performance in the form of the aver-
age annual price movement to a high and low from
a mean price for each year. The company’s cor-
porate governance arrangements are described by:
‘Board Size’, which records the total number of di-
rectors on the board in each year; and ‘% Non-
execs’ which provides the percentage of the board
classiﬁed as non-executive in that year.
5In the later years of our sample, the director who is the
SNED is also expected to be independent under the Code,
hence the SNED is also known as the SID (Senior Inde-
pendent Director). However, it is possible for Manifest to
consider a ‘SNED’ or ‘SID’ as non-independent if they
do not meet their criteria.
Data analysis
The initial analysis investigates the extent to which
women have shorter boardroom careers than
men. This is done both using simple descriptive
statistics and in a linear regression model where
the dependent variable is the length of boardroom
service (in days). Then, the propensity to appoint
women as non-executive directors, but not to
award them senior director status, is analysed
in a probit model. Next, following Mulcahy and
Linehan (2014), a difference-in-differences model
is used to analyse the glass-cliff effect, using data
that extend over a larger sample of companies
and a longer time-period than in their original
analysis. The analysis culminates in using survival
analysis to investigate the differential probability
of continued service between male and female
non-executive directors over their boardroom
careers.
Results
Table 1 provides a summary of the differences
between male and female careers in our sample.
Women and men are different in several respects.
As documented elsewhere (Gregory-Smith, Main
and O’Reilly, 2014), women make up a small frac-
tion of directors over the sample period in the UK,
albeit women have been catching up with men in
recent years. However, to our knowledge, Table 1
is the ﬁrst to document the substantial difference
in average boardroom career length (‘Tenure’)
between men and women over this period. The
mean duration of boardroom tenure for women
in this simple analysis is 4.61 years, compared
with 6.75 years for men (a statistically signiﬁcant
difference). Female non-executive directors are
also less likely to be the identiﬁed as ‘Senior
Director’.
To be in compliance with the Code (FRC,
2014), over 50% of the board (excluding the
Chair) must be independent. There is no formal
penalty for non-compliance with the Code, but
companies are required to explain their reasons for
non-compliance to shareholders.6 A common jus-
tiﬁcation offered for retaining a non-independent
6In theory, a shareholder who is unhappy with the com-
pany’s explanation for non-compliance can vote against
the board at the AGM or, ultimately, sell their shares.
Some form of explanation of non-compliance is required
© 2017 The Authors British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Female andmale executive and non-executive directors on
UK boards
Women Men p-value
N 1,453 23,134 –
Exec 411 9,871 –
Non-exec 1,042 13,263 –
Tenure
Mean 4.61 6.75 <0.01
SD 4.30 6.14 –
Median 3.68 5.27 –
% Survive until
<3 years 41.70% 29.30% <0.01
3–6 years 30.62% 27.28% <0.01
6–9 years 17.27% 18.59% 0.18
>9 years 10.39% 24.82% <0.01
Age on appointment 47.7 50.05 <0.01
Executive directors
CEO 12.90% 22.82% <0.01
Non-executive directors
Independent 81.09% 60.80% <0.01
Senior Director 5.75% 12.51% <0.01
Notes:
 The sample consists of executive and non-executive directors
serving on UK boards in the FTSE All-Share between 1996
and 2010. The time-series on each individual director is aggre-
gated so that each row observation represents one director-
career in the sample. Here, the count on Tenure continues if a
director changes position within the ﬁrm (e.g. from executive
to non-executive) or even between ﬁrms. We control for these
changes in subsequent analysis.
 The percentages under the survival heading show the percent-
age of women (men) who survive until the respective length
of time. Women are more likely to exit within three years, and
men aremore likely to survive over nine years. The p-values in-
dicate the differences between the proportions are statistically
signiﬁcant (even after controlling for very different numbers
of men and women in the sample).
 CEO refers to the percentage of female (male) executive di-
rectors who obtain the CEO position in their career. Inde-
pendent and Senior Director refer to the percentage of female
(male) non-executive directors who are classiﬁed as ‘indepen-
dent’ and identiﬁed as the ‘Senior non-executive director’, re-
spectively, for the majority of their career. Women are far less
likely to be the CEO or the Senior non-executive director, but
muchmore likely to be independent. Additionally, women are
appointed at a younger age.
director on the board includes the importance
of the accumulated experience or ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital contributed to the board by the
director. Table 1 shows that women are much
more likely to be independent than men – a point
we return to below.
as a condition of share-listing under the rules published
by the UK Listing Authority.
Shorter board service for women
The ﬁnding of shorter board tenure for women
is examined in greater detail in the ordinary
least square analysis in Table 2. Consistent with
Table 1, this analysis concludes that women who
take boardroom positions have shorter completed
careers. Column (1) shows that, in total, female di-
rectors are employed for an average of 781 fewer
days (or just over two years) than male directors.
The introduction of standard controls in column
(2) – for directors’ personal characteristics (posi-
tion – executive or non-executive, and age on ap-
pointment), for the company’s corporate gover-
nance (board size and % non-executive), for the
company’s characteristics (log of size and indus-
try dummy variables) and for performance (volatil-
ity of performance, price-to-book ratio, return on
assets and total shareholder return) does not di-
minish this gap. Whereas Table 1 and the results
in columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 include the ob-
served length of service of all directors in the sam-
ple (including those who are still active), column
(3) drops all right-censored careers in our data –
that is those who had not yet exited the board
by the end of the sample period. This focuses the
analysis on the completed length of a company di-
rectorships (measured in days) for those directors
observed exiting company boards over the period
1996–2010. These are all completed spells or ca-
reers as a board director. Even after this adjust-
ment, however, the gender difference remains (and
in fact grows slightly). So it is not any difference
in the tendency for a director to be right-censored
or differences in the individual or company-level
characteristics between women and men that ex-
plains the gap in average boardroom tenure.
There is yet one further dimension relating
to timing of appointments that requires inves-
tigation. Mean tenure for male directors in our
sample is higher than the median male tenure
because there are some instances of male directors
with very long tenure. To what extent the mean
represents an ‘average’, then, is complicated by the
fact that some of the long-serving male directors
were appointed prior to the sample start date in
1996. This is a problem (known as left-truncation),
because there will have been other male directors
who were appointed at the same time, but exited
prior to the sample start date. Had these directors
been observed, our male average would be lower.
One could take the view that a priori the female
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Table 2. OLS analysis of executive and non-executive director tenure (days on board)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female −781*** −959*** −1,030*** −235*** −170***
(17.8) (19.8) (17.3) (7.35) (4.38)
Director-level controls
Age on appointment −549*** −524*** −9.11 8.44
(21.1) (17.9) (0.75) (0.65)
Age on appointment squared 4.57*** 4.33*** −0.039 −0.15
(18.5) (15.5) (0.33) (1.19)
Executive −784*** −892*** −210*** −259***
(20.0) (20.6) (9.32) (10.6)
Firm-level controls
Ln Firm Size −81.5*** −34.0*** −28.1*** 14.4**
(9.43) (3.39) (4.77) (2.20)
TSR 320*** 305*** 144*** 101***
(21.2) (19.0) (13.6) (9.23)
ROA 1,748*** 1,785*** 874*** 805***
(16.2) (15.6) (13.3) (12.0)
PTOB −5.45*** −5.52*** −3.13*** −3.15***
(7.09) (6.80) (7.58) (7.51)
Volatility −1,019*** −894*** −159 −4.18
(5.44) (4.48) (1.42) (0.037)
Board Size 8.23 −9.39 −16.7*** −35.5***
(1.43) (1.47) (4.26) (8.31)
% Non-execs −842*** −501*** 40.5 126*
(9.16) (4.71) (0.67) (1.82)
Observations 24,587 20,501 16,360 14,296 10,465
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Right censoring control No No Yes No Yes
Left censoring control No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.007 0.237 0.227 0.067 0.066
Notes:
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
The table shows an OLS regression of the number of days by which women’s careers are shorter than men’s careers. As in Table 1,
each observation is one career. Columns (4) and (5) show that roughly three-quarters of the raw difference is driven by directors who
were appointed prior to 1996, the ﬁrst full year in our sample. This is because long-serving directors are much more likely to be male
than female, given the historical context of these appointments. Nevertheless, a signiﬁcant difference between male and female directors
remains after excluding these appointments.
average has an equal chance of being affected by
left truncation, and so a comparison of the two av-
erages remains informative. However, we suspect
that we are missingmore pre-sample short-tenured
males than females, owing to the greater likeli-
hood that the pre-sample appointment is male.
Indeed, it is found that excluding the pre-sample
appointments in columns (4) and (5) reduces the
difference between male and female tenure by
approximately three-quarters. Nevertheless, even
after excluding pre-sample appointments, there
remains an unexplained difference in the tenures
of men and women of between 235 days in column
(4) (which excludes careers already started before
1996) and 170 days in column (5) (which excludes
all careers that are not completely observed from
start to ﬁnish, thereby reducing the sample to only
those whose careers are observed in their entirety
from beginning to end). Even after all these con-
trols, there remains an empirically and statistically
signiﬁcant difference in male vs. female board-
room careers. The survival analysis documented
below, in Table 5, will control directly for these key
features of the data.
The overwhelming majority of female directors
are non-executives. Since the non-executive market
could be viewed as quite distinct from the execu-
tive market, we restrict analysis from here onwards
to non-executive directors only. Table 3 focuses
on the status of non-executive appointments. It
presents a probit estimation of the probability,
based on observable characteristics, that a given
non-executive appointment is classiﬁed as an
‘independent’ director or as the SNED. Again,
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Table 3. Probit analysis of non-executive director independence; and of being the senior non-executive director
Pr (Independent = 1) Pr (Senior = 1) Pr (Senior = 1)
Female 0.32*** −0.32*** −0.064
(5.37) (4.46) (0.43)
Independent 0.29*** 0.31***
(8.08) (8.29)
Female.Independent −0.33*
(1.96)
Director-level controls
Age on appointment 0.15*** 0.079*** 0.080***
(7.90) (3.49) (3.55)
Age on appointment squared −0.0012*** −0.00060*** −0.00062***
(6.91) (2.80) (2.87)
Firm-level controls
Ln Firm Size 0.16*** 0.016 0.017
(17.2) (1.60) (1.63)
TSR 0.13*** 0.024 0.024
(9.80) (1.48) (1.46)
ROA −0.11 −0.082 −0.083
(0.78) (0.59) (0.60)
PTOB 0.00094 −0.0011 −0.0011
(0.88) (1.14) (1.13)
Volatility 0.38* 0.17 0.17
(1.71) (0.77) (0.78)
Board Size −0.023*** −0.070*** −0.070***
(3.73) (9.84) (9.86)
% Non-execs −0.061 −1.32*** −1.32***
(0.70) (13.3) (13.2)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,036 12,036 12,036
Notes:
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
 Probit model estimating the likelihood of observing an independent non-executive director (column 1) and the likelihood of ob-
serving a senior non-executive director (columns 2 and 3). Consistent with Table 1, a female non-executive director is more likely to
be independent and less likely to be classiﬁed as the senior non-executive director. Additionally, the interaction term in column (3)
indicates that a female independent director is less likely to be the senior non-executive director.
 As the Probit is a non-linear model, the precise marginal effects vary over the range of sample values. For illustrative purposes, the
coefficient on ‘Female’ in column (1) gives rise to an ‘average marginal effect’ (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) of 10.5%. This means,
on average, being female raises the likelihood of that non-executive director being observed as independent by about ten percentage
points, conditional on other observables. The results in column (3) indicate that male independent directors are almost twice as
likely as female independent directors to be the senior non-executive director (14.6% vs 7.97%).
the differences between male and female directors
are remarkably sharp. For example, the coefficient
on ‘Female’ in column (1) gives rise to an average
marginal effect (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) of
10.5%. This means, on average, being female raises
the likelihood of a non-executive director being
observed as independent by about ten percentage
points, conditional on other observables.7 The
7To allow for the fact that the gender difference in
independence may be a reﬂection of differing lengths
of board tenure, the analysis in Table 3 has been re-
estimates in column (2) describe the probability
of a non-executive being appointed as SNED.
Here there is a markedly negative impact of
being female, with the probability being some ten
percentage points lower for women than men.
The ﬁnal column of Table 3 uses an interaction
peated using independence status at the time of appoint-
ment. The results, available at: http://www.homepages.
ed.ac.uk/mainbg/working_papers.htm, are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar, thus strengthening our conclu-
sion regarding the importance of independence status.
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term between gender and independent status
to demonstrate that independent male directors
are almost twice as likely as independent female
directors to be the SNED (14.6% vs. 7.97%).
The glass cliff
Having documented observed shorter boardroom
tenures of female directors in our data, we con-
sider the possibility that it is the greater risk that
women face at the time of their appointment to
their roles on company boards that causes their
shorter careers. This is what we would expect as
a result of the phenomenon of the glass cliff (Ryan
andHaslam, 2005). Indeed, in our raw descriptives
in Table 1, women can be seen to be more likely
thanmen to exit the ﬁrmwithin the ﬁrst three years
(42% vs. 29%). The cleanest quantitative ﬁrm-level
test of the glass cliff in the literature to date is
the difference-in-differences approach presented in
a recent paper by Mulcahy and Linehan (2014).
We replicate the analysis of Mulcahy and Linehan
(2014) and apply their method to our larger sample
of UK companies.
Mulcahy and Linehan (2014) identify a ‘loss
sample’ composed of thoseUK companies that ex-
perienced a ﬁnancial loss (negative net income) in
any of the years 2004–2006, subject to having re-
ported a proﬁt (positive net income) in the preced-
ing two years. Each company in this ‘loss sample’
is then matched against the company in the same
industry that is closest to it in terms of market cap-
italization, but which reported a proﬁt not only
in the focal ‘loss year’, but also in the two years
prior to the loss year and in the two years subse-
quent (i.e. proﬁt in ﬁve years in a row). To mea-
sure the difference in gender diversityMulcahy and
Linehan (2014) take the difference in the percent-
age of females (%FEM) on the board between t+1
and t−1, where t is the loss year. Two other mea-
sures of diversity, the Blau index (Blau, 1977) and
the Shannon index (Shannon, 1948) are also com-
puted in the same way.
By matching each loss company to a control
company within a difference-in-differences design,
it is possible under certain conditions8 to identify
8For the difference-in-differences design to identify the
causal effect, it requires the assumption that there are no
pre-sample differences in the trend towards gender diver-
sity between loss sample and the control sample. It is ar-
gued that this is a plausible assumption, given that both
any causal effect that a loss event has on subse-
quent gender diversity. The original Mulcahy and
Linehan (2014) ﬁndings are reprinted in column
(1) of Table 4, designated ‘ML14’, and in Panel A
fail to establish the presence of a signiﬁcant effect.
In column (2) of Table 4, we replicate the Mulcahy
and Linehan (2014) analysis, drawing on the same
years (2004–2006) from our sample and then ex-
tend the analysis, in column (3), to the full range
of focal years 1998–2009, using the full sample of
companies in our data set.9 In columns (2) and (3)
of panel A in Table 4, we ﬁnd no evidence that loss
events increase gender diversity. This is consistent
with Mulcahy and Linehan’s (2014) ﬁrst test.
Finding no signiﬁcant effect (see column (1)
in panel A of Table 4), Mulcahy and Linehan
(2014) then turned to a second analysis that splits
the loss sample at the median so as to identify
separately the impact of a relatively large losses
from small losses. This is done by running an
OLS regression on the observed difference in gen-
der diversity among these companies.10 The orig-
inal Mulcahy and Linehan (2014) results for this
second analysis are reprinted in column (1) of
panel B in Table 4. Under all three measures
of diversity, a signiﬁcant effect is found. How-
ever, in columns (2) and (3) of panel B in Ta-
ble 4 we are unable to replicate the ﬁnding that
the big-loss companies increase their gender di-
versity by more than the small-loss companies
and by more than the proﬁtable companies –
even when we extend the analyses to draw on the
full range of observations available in our sam-
ple.11 These results are reported in column (3) of
Table 4.
Taken together, we believe that a reasonable in-
terpretation is that there is no support in our data
for the view of companies responding to a loss
event by appointing more women to their boards.
loss companies and control companies report proﬁts in
the prior two years.
9Our ﬁnal focal year for a loss is 2009, as subsequent years
of observation are necessary to perform the difference-in-
differences analysis.
10The OLS regression also controls for the market return
of each company, although this variable is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
11The small sample size in the original study and the
absence of AIM and FTSE Fledgling companies from
our sample may partially explain the difference in our
results in panel B, as corporate governance adjustments
can be stickier among larger ﬁrms (Brown, Beekes and
Verhoeven, 2011).
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Table 4. Difference-in-differences estimation of accounting loss on
boardroom diversity: replication and extension of Mulcahy and
Linehan (2014)
(1) (2) (3)
ML14 Replication Extension
Panel A
% FEM 0.009 0.014 0.000
p>|t| (0.95) (0.17) (0.992)
Blau 0.014 0.018 −0.006
p>|t| (0.31) (0.77) (0.58)
Shannon 0.024 0.023 −0.012
p>|t| (0.24) (0.64) 0.521
No. control baseline 138 124 478
No. control follow up 124 124 478
No. treated baseline 138 124 501
No. treated follow up 114 116 501
Panel B
%FEM big-loss 0.028*** −0.003 −0.004
(2.56) (0.18) (0.67)
Blau big-loss 0.037** 0.006 −0.013*
(2.37) (0.03) (1.78)
Shannon big-loss 0.055** 0.007 −0.027*
(2.25) (0.21) (1.91)
N 238 240 979
Notes:
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 In panel A, the estimated coefficients report the difference-
in-differences parameter. Under certain assumptions, this pa-
rameter identiﬁes the causal effect of the loss event on gen-
der diversity. Coefficients in column (1) are obtained from
columns (7) and (3) in Table 3 ofMulcahy and Linehan (2014)
abbreviated as ML14 above.
 In panel A, the replication of Mulcahy and Linehan (2014)
is given in column (2). Our results are consistent with theirs;
that is, the loss-sample experiences no signiﬁcant difference
in the trend of female appointments. The same result is found
in column (3) with the much larger sample of loss companies
spanning the years available in our data set. Together, these
results suggest that ﬁrms do not react immediately to a loss
event by increasing gender diversity (however measured).
 In panel B, we are unable to replicate the ﬁnding of Mulcahy
and Linehan (2014) that big-loss companies are more likely
to increase gender diversity than small-loss or no-loss compa-
nies. The absence of an increase in gender diversity following
a loss event is consistent with Mulcahy and Linehan’s (2014)
ﬁrst experiment and the ﬁndings on our full sample as shown
in column (3).
These results lead us to reject our ﬁrst hypothesis
(Hypothesis 1).
Survival analysis
We now turn to direct modelling of the duration
of director careers. To this end, we adopt a survival
model of director tenure (Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice,
1980), with the ‘failure’ event being a director’s exit
from the ﬁrm.12 As alluded to in our discussion
of Table 2, our sample contains left truncation, as
some directors were appointed prior to the sample
start date and also right censoring, as some direc-
tors remain in post at the end of the sample. Both
these aspects of our data are controlled for in the
Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972).
If the glass-cliff effect on appointment were driv-
ing the observed shorter female director tenures in
our data, we would expect to observe a high haz-
ard of exit for female directors early in their tenure.
The riskier conditions on appointment for female
directors should be associated with a higher prob-
ability of exit in those early years. However, this is
not what we observe. Column (1) of Table 5 reports
the estimated coefficients of the impact of being fe-
male on exit, along with control variables to cap-
ture person and ﬁrm characteristics. Gender (‘Fe-
male’) is interacted with the year of exit (‘Female2’
for female exiting in year two,‘Female3’, and so
on). In column (1) in Table 5, it can be seen that,
when women reach nine years of tenure, they face
a dramatic increase in their hazard rate. Indeed,
the female-tenure at nine years is the only female-
tenure interaction that is statistically signiﬁcant.
Women experience a large spike in their proba-
bility of exit around year nine that is not shared
by male directors. This result is consistent with
the raw data, where we ﬁnd that, of those mak-
ing it to year nine, 37% of women exit that year,
while only 18% of men exit that year. This ﬁnding
means that we cannot reject our second hypothesis
(Hypothesis 2) that, after nine years of board ser-
vice, the hazard rate of board exit increases for
female directors relative to male directors.
Why the sudden increase in female exits around
year nine? We suggest that this is, at least in part,
due to the institutional framework in the UK. Af-
ter nine years of service, the UK Corporate Gov-
ernance Code (FRC, 2014) raises a question mark
over the independence of non-executive directors.
In Hypothesis 3, we hypothesized, consistent with
the discussion of role-congruity theory above, that
12We are able to observe directors in different positions in
the same ﬁrm. We are also able to observe the same direc-
tor at different ﬁrms. Here, a director’s tenure is ﬁrm spe-
ciﬁc; that is, we only reset the clock on a director’s tenure
when they leave the ﬁrm. A positional change inside the
same ﬁrm does not count as an exit in our analysis.
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Table 5. Survival analysis of non-executive directors: gender and independence
(1) (2) (3)
Age on appointment −0.13*** (6.46) −0.14*** (8.00) −0.14*** (7.99)
Age on appointment squared 0.0014*** (7.10) 0.0014*** (8.62) 0.0014*** (8.60)
Ln Firm Size −0.028*** (3.49) −0.025*** (3.22) −0.025*** (3.25)
TSR −0.13*** (4.13) −0.13*** (4.49) −0.13*** (4.47)
Accumulated TSR −0.16*** (9.41) −0.16*** (10.2) −0.16*** (10.2)
ROA −0.66*** (8.44) −0.66*** (8.24) −0.66*** (8.23)
PTOB 0.000087 (0.71) 0.000092 (0.44) 0.000094 (0.45)
Volatility −0.54*** (4.28) −0.54*** (4.68) −0.54*** (4.66)
Board Size 0.056*** (9.72) 0.056*** (11.0) 0.056*** (11.0)
% Non-execs 0.14* (1.74) 0.15* (1.89) 0.15* (1.85)
No. Females on Board 0.081*** (4.89) 0.081*** (4.73) 0.080*** (4.67)
Female −0.048 (0.47) −0.012 (0.23) −0.10 (0.95)
Female2 −0.023 (0.13)
Female3 0.019 (0.11)
Female4 −0.12 (0.62)
Female5 −0.16 (0.80)
Female6 0.043 (0.21)
Female7 0.20 (0.92)
Female8 0.29 (1.28)
Female9 0.96*** (4.70)
Female10 −0.30 (1.02)
Independent 0.083** (2.48) −0.071 (1.12) −0.082 (1.25)
Independent2 0.059 (0.57) 0.072 (0.68)
Independent3 0.039 (0.39) 0.048 (0.48)
Independent4 0.16 (1.53) 0.18* (1.72)
Independent5 −0.052 (0.51) −0.031 (0.30)
Independent6 0.17 (1.51) 0.18* (1.66)
Independent7 0.21* (1.74) 0.20 (1.63)
Independent8 0.26** (2.21) 0.25** (2.15)
Independent9 0.36*** (3.02) 0.32*** (2.60)
Independent10 0.39*** (4.30) 0.40*** (4.33)
Independent.Female 0.14 (0.88)
Independent2.Female −0.10 (0.50)
Independent3.Female −0.067 (0.34)
Independent4.Female −0.23 (1.04)
Independent5.Female −0.20 (0.89)
Independent6.Female −0.17 (0.73)
Independent7.Female 0.22 (0.92)
Independent8.Female 0.15 (0.57)
Independent9.Female 0.86*** (3.32)
Independent10.Female −0.018 (0.051)
Observations 71,216 71,216 71,216
Notes.
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 The reported coefficients are estimated by a Cox proportional hazards model of non-executive careers. Positive coefficients raise
the likelihood of exit. A one unit increase in the covariate leads to eβx increase in the hazard. For example, in column (1), being
independent raises the hazard by 8% (e0.083  1.084).
 Our central interest is in the time-varying nature of being female and independent on the likelihood of exit. Following Cleves, Gould
and Gutierrez (2004, p. 187) we use stsplit in Stata 13.1 to identify the time-varying effect. In column (1), being female instead of
male more than doubles the likelihood of exit (e0.96  2.61) at nine years of service. In column (3), being female and independent
instead of being male and independent doubles the likelihood of exit (e0.86  2.36) at the point of nine years of service.
this is the driving factor behind female exits. It can
be seen from the analysis in Table 3 that women are
much more likely to be independent non-executive
directors and the loss of this independence may be
associated with a major upturn in the hazard of
their leaving the board.
To test this hypothesis, we investigate the
possibility that the effect of losing independence
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Figure 1. Predicted baseline hazard estimates for non-executive directors
Note: The graph on the left-hand side plots an estimate of the baseline hazard for female and male non-executive directors after stcurve in
Stata 13.1, using the procedure described in (Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez, 2004). This captures the information embodied in the estimated
coefficients in column (1) of Table 5. The hazards evolve similarly until the dramatic spike in the likelihood of female exit at year nine. The
graph on the right-hand side plots separately the baseline hazards for female and male non-executive directors according to whether they
are independent. This captures the information embodied in the estimated coefficients in column (3) of Table 5. It is revealing that the spike
in the hazard at year nine occurs only for independent directors and is much more pronounced for female independent directors
after nine years could apply equally to men as
to women, and what we observe for women may
simply be a manifestation of a greater proportion
of women originally being classiﬁed as indepen-
dent on appointment. Column (2) in Table 5 allows
an interaction between independence status and
length of service (‘Independent2’,‘Independent3’
and so on). It shows that the nine-year effect on
independence status is certainly present when
grouping both male and female directors together,
but the gender-speciﬁc interactions in column (3)
(‘Independent2.Female’, ‘Independent3.Female’
and so on) indicate that, while the effect is im-
portant for males, it is much more important for
females (as shown by the positive coefficient of
0.86 on the interaction term between indepen-
dence and female at year nine). The unconditional
likelihood of exit at year nine is approximately
10%, so being female and independent increases
this to approximately 28% (being male and in-
dependent increases the hazard from 10% to
13%). The cumulative effect on an estimate of the
baseline hazard13 is clear in Figure 1, where female
independent directors experience a much higher
risk of exiting the board at the nine-year mark
(the nine-year independence effect) than do their
equivalent male directors. These ﬁndings mean
that we are unable to reject our third hypothesis
(Hypothesis 3), namely that the increase in the
relative hazard rate of board exit is associated
with a loss of independence.
13This makes use of stcurve in Stata, as the Cox model
itself does not estimate the baseline hazard.
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Robustness tests
A wide range of robustness checks have been per-
formed on the ﬁndings reported above. These are
presented in TableA1 in theAppendix. The follow-
ing tests are considered:
 allowing for the issue being one of age diver-
sity (Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernandez-Izquierdo and
Munoz-Torres, 2015) rather than independence
as such by adding an interaction between age
and independence status;
 allowing for the effect of cumulating years of ex-
perience on the board lest this be driving the
result (Elstad and Ladegard, 2012);
 allowing for industry-speciﬁc effects on the im-
portance of independence, given that women
directors are not evenly distributed across
industries (Adams and Ferreira, 2009);
 allowing that the percentage of females already
on the board might suggest a different cul-
ture and hence different treatment of women
directors (Terjesen, Sealy and Singh, 2009).
None of these additional experiments contradicts
the ﬁnding that there is a sharp upward spike in
the hazard of exiting the board that faces female
directors after nine years of service, and that this
is associated with their status as an independent
director. We discuss the results of the robustness
checks in further detail in the Appendix.
Discussion
Using a comprehensive sample of UK company
boards over a long period, this paper has identi-
ﬁed that women directors last a shorter time on
UK boards than male directors do. This differ-
ence is not fully explained by differences in observ-
able characteristics between women and men. In-
stead, women seem to suffer shorter careers simply
because they are women. The glass cliff effect on
appointment does not itself appear to be the rea-
son why women experience these shorter careers.
When we replicated the difference-in-differences
approach of Mulcahy and Linehan (2014), we fail
to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effect that can be ascribed
to the period preceding the time of appointment.
We do, however, ﬁnd evidence of a glass-cliff-type
phenomenon further down the line.
The evidence that we ﬁnd shows that women
are liable to be at greater risk of leaving the board
than men are, and especially after a period of nine
years on the board (at which point they lose their
independence in the eyes of UK corporate gover-
nance codes). In other words, it is largely the ab-
sence of long-serving female directors in our data
that drives the differences in average tenure, not
a greater volume of early exits of women. Fur-
thermore, we ﬁnd a strong association between a
woman’s tenure on a board and her status as an
independent director. Our ﬁndings point to a pro-
cess at work whereby women are less likely to be
retained as company directors once their period
of nine years is over. The results from the sur-
vival analysis suggest that this is directly related to
the institutional arrangements in the UK whereby
non-executive directors lose their independence
status after they reach nine years of boardroom
service. It would seem that this loss of indepen-
dence status afflicts directors who are women to a
greater extent than directors who are men.
It is worth emphasizing that, in the UK’s ‘com-
ply or explain’ corporate governance environment,
exiting the board is not a required outcome fol-
lowing from a loss of independence. And is not
a fate shared to nearly the same extent by men.
This suggests that women are being deployed,
in part, as a symbol of the independence of the
company’s corporate governance arrangements.
In appointing a female non-executive director,
companies seem to be placing particular emphasis
on independence – and our results show that
women are more likely to be classed as indepen-
dent during their boardroom service. The use
of female boardroom appointments to ﬂag up
the independence of the board is consistent with
symbolic management (Westphal, 2010; Westphal
and Zajac, 1994, 1995). It is the symbolism of that
action and the status of independence that matters.
However, once that symbolic status disappears
(in this case owing to the completion of nine-
years’ service on the board), the usefulness of
the appointment also disappears. Compared with
their male counterparts, it is relatively rare for a
company to use its ‘explain’ option in the ‘comply
or explain’ system (FRC, 2014) to hold on to
longer-serving female directors. The independence
trait plays a crucial role in effecting legitimacy for
the board’s actions (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002;
Hillman, Shropshire and Canella, 2007) and, once
it is gone, the director’s usefulness diminishes. The
female director is then exposed, and her continu-
ing tenure on the board is at risk to an extent not
© 2017 The Authors British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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experienced by her male boardroom colleagues.
This tension can arise from several sources. The
one we have highlighted above is related to role
incongruity (Eagly and Carli, 2003; Johnson et al.,
2008) whereby, once the cloak of independence
falls away, a woman director is exposed to the
stereotypical expectations of what traits women
possess and what traits boardroom directors
should have. Exposed to these incongruent expec-
tations, a woman is more likely to exit the board
at this point.
Other explanations are possible, however, and
we have not been able to rule these out using
our archival data. For example, it may simply be
the case that women have a greater propensity to
choose to exit at this stage – perhaps to pursue al-
ternative opportunities on other boards (although
there was no evidence of this judged by movement
to any of the 900 or so companies in the data). This
underlines a further limitation of our analysis in
that the precise mode of the director’s exit is unob-
served. Ideally, we would wish to be able to distin-
guish between tenures that end by choice of the di-
rector (voluntary) and those that end by the choice
of the company (forced). Although we are able to
condition the results above on a wide range of ob-
servables such as company performance, Gregory-
Smith, Thompson and Wright (2009) note that
company performance affects the hazards of the
competing modes of exit differently, depending on
length of service.
These considerations raise questions that under-
line some limitations in the current study. It cannot
provide the depth of detail to understand fully the
context of the decisions taking place when direc-
tors approach nine years of boardroom service.We
have suggested that role congruity theory (Eagly,
1987) may explain the differential treatment be-
tween men and women when their independence
status falls away, but this can only really be ex-
plored by a more qualitative research investiga-
tion, possibly using in-depth interviews with the
key players (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005).
There is also the related issue of causality, which in
the current research design remains moot. Both of
these considerations point to the potential of ex-
perimental or laboratory studies to shed light on
the precise mechanisms at work in this context.
In a discussion of work relating to the glass cliff,
Bruckmuller et al. (2014) have recently reviewed
the range of possibilities here. Making use of the
conditions presented by a natural experiment, such
as a change in regulations that imposes a change in
the independence status of serving directors, is an-
other possibility. But while Higgs (2003) formal-
ized the nine-year guideline, it had been used in
practice since Cadbury (1992), which pre-dates our
data.
In terms of the policy implications of our ﬁnd-
ings, a recent policy document by the Financial Re-
porting Council (FRC, 2015) explicitly recognizes
that staying on UK boards after nine years is an
empirically signiﬁcant phenomenon. In the con-
text of the report’s focus, succession at the top of
UK companies, it portrays this as a problematic
position-blocking phenomenon that may be im-
peding the refreshing of boardroom positions and
hence inhibiting increased diversity:
There has been some debate about the Code’s refer-
ence to a nine years’ tenure period for independent
non-executives. This is the point at which length of
service becomes a determining factor for boards and
shareholders when considering independence. It is
said that this has hindered the increase of women on
boards, either because the period is too long, or be-
cause companies are not observing the Code and too
many directors are serving greater than nine years.
(FRC, 2015, p. 12)
The research results presented above provide evi-
dence that the role of the nine-year term limitation
is indeed undermining the diversity of the board
(in that more women than men are clearly exit-
ing at this stage). A policy change to oblige all
directors to stand down at nine years would re-
sult in a greater turnover of positions and hence
increased opportunity to appoint a more diverse
board. However, not only would this represent a
marked break with theUK traditional ‘comply-or-
explain’ approach to corporate governance (Veld-
man and Willmott, 2016), but it would not neces-
sarily get to the heart of the problem. Our previous
work on board appointments in the UK (Gregory-
Smith, Main and O’Reilly, 2014) conﬁrmed the
ﬁndings for the USA (Farrell and Hersch, 2005)
that boards display a tendency to replace men with
men and women with women. Our results here
point to a possibly deeper issue than the lack of
opportunity, in that the ﬁndings discussed above
support the notion that, without the attribute of
independence, female directors are not regarded
equally with male directors. Policy would per-
haps be better oriented towards tackling these is-
sues head on, rather than redeﬁning the corporate
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governance guidelines that inﬂuence boardroom
service.
Conclusion
In summary, while recent progress in appointing
a greater number of women to UK boards can or
may be applauded, our data would suggest that
many of these appointments were used symboli-
cally to signal greater independence, as well as to
answer the call for greater diversity. These actions
notwithstanding, there appears to remain a differ-
ential treatment of men and women directors. In
particular, our ﬁndings point to a markedly differ-
ent treatment of male vs. female outside directors
once they reach nine years of service and lose their
independence status. This effect is consistent with
the holding of biased stereotypes regarding the role
congruity of women in senior leadership positions.
Whereas women serving as independent directors
are seen as positively helpful from a symbolic man-
agement perspective (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; West-
phal and Zajac, 1994, 1995, 1998), the world of
a long-serving director, absent the status of inde-
pendence, places women in a social role for which
they are stereotyped as mismatched (Bakan, 1966;
Eagly, 1987). This is evidenced by their system-
atic removal from boards after nine years of ser-
vice. It could be argued that, in the interests of
good corporate governance, there should be no
outside directors serving beyond nine years. But
true equality of treatment will not come until men
and women are replaced with a similar propensity
at the nine-year mark and there is a sweeping away
of the residual role-incongruity stereotyping that
seems to linger in UK boardrooms.
Appendix
Extending the analysis of the sensitivity of the
results to age effects, column (1) in Table A1 in-
troduces an interaction between age and director
independence. The interaction term is signiﬁcant,
suggesting that older independent directors are
less at risk than younger independent directors,
other things being equal. To the extent that age
proxies for experience (Elstad and Ladegard,
2012; Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernandez-Izquierdo and
Munoz-Torres, 2015), this is consistent with
the reasonable notion that, when deciding on
the retention of non-executive directors, a com-
pany weighs up both director independence and
accumulated experience.
To explore this further, we control for accu-
mulated boardroom experience more directly in
columns (2)–(4). We introduce two variables, the
ﬁrst counting executive years of service in-sample,
but outside the company of interest, and the sec-
ond doing the same, but for non-executive years of
service. Of the two, it appears that non-executive
years of service is the more relevant identiﬁer
of the experience that companies value in their
non-executive directors, as only this variable has
the effect of reducing the hazard of exit.
All our main speciﬁcations include a set of
industry dummies, but in columns (3) and (4) we
additionally control for the possibility that inde-
pendence may have a different size effect across
different industries (Adams and Ferreira, 2009)
by introducing interaction terms between inde-
pendence and industry sector. The omitted sector
is Technology. Relative to this base, the results in
column (3) indicate that being independent in the
Financial sector or in the Consumer Service sector
is more risky. Without more priors from theory, it
is difficult to attribute too much to the differences
between these industries but, importantly for
our purposes, the spike in female hazard at year
9 remains unchanged by the inclusion of these
interactions.
Column (4) introduces the percentage of women
on the board by gender (Terjesen, Sealy and Singh,
2009), and it appears that being on a board with
more females is less risky in terms of decreasing
the general risk of exiting the board in any year.
This effect is not changed if the director of interest
is a woman. However, again, the spike in female
hazard at nine years remains unchanged.
Overall, therefore, the results ﬁrst discussed in
Table 5 remain valid, even after being subjected to
the above robustness checks.
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Table A1. Robustness checks on Cox proportional hazards model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.045 −0.036 −0.042 −0.12
(0.45) (0.36) (0.42) (0.87)
Female2 −0.044 −0.041 −0.040 −0.040
(0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Female3 0.032 0.039 0.039 0.038
(0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
Female4 −0.040 −0.031 −0.029 −0.030
(0.31) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23)
Female8 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.22
(0.90) (0.98) (0.98) (0.95)
Female9 0.83*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.85***
(3.66) (3.75) (3.80) (3.77)
Female10 −0.23 −0.23 −0.21 −0.22
(0.91) (0.88) (0.81) (0.84)
Independent 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.81*** 0.81***
(5.55) (5.46) (4.24) (4.26)
Independent.age −0.017*** −0.016*** −0.017*** −0.017***
(5.23) (5.09) (5.18) (5.18)
Experience Exec 0.0024 0.0023 0.0022
(1.12) (1.05) (1.03)
Experience Non-exec −0.0015*** −0.0015*** −0.0015***
(4.82) (4.83) (4.75)
% Female −0.98**
(2.39)
% Female.Female 0.56
(0.97)
Industry interactions with independence
Ind.Oil & Gas 0.067 0.069
(0.35) (0.36)
Ind.Basic Materials 0.26 0.26
(1.60) (1.58)
Ind.Industrials 0.18* 0.18*
(1.74) (1.75)
Ind.Consumer Goods 0.17 0.16
(1.36) (1.33)
Ind.Health Care 0.16 0.15
(1.17) (1.12)
Ind.Consumer Services 0.31*** 0.30***
(2.88) (2.82)
Ind.Telecommunications −0.31* −0.31*
(1.66) (1.68)
Ind.Utilities 0.11 0.11
(0.50) (0.47)
Ind.Financials 0.14 0.15
(1.45) (1.50)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66,739 66,739 66,739 66,739
z-statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Column (1) introduces an interaction between age and independence. Column (2) attempts to control for accumulated experience on
the board by counting a running total of years of service (whether at this ﬁrm or another) separately for executive-years and non-
executive-years. Column (3) introduces interactions between independence and the industry dummies. Column (4) controls for % of
females already on the board (by gender).
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